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INTELLECTUAL COHERENCE IN AN
EVIDENCE CODE
Paul F. Rothstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence (Federal Rules or Rules) were
created in large part to promote uniformity and predictability in fed-
eral trials by providing a relatively instructive guide for judges and
lawyers concerning the admissibility of evidence. As with any codifi-
cation, success in this respect requires, among other things, that there
be a considerable degree of intellectual coherence among the code's
various provisions. The Federal Rules fall short of intellectual coher-
ence in a number of areas. They contain contradictory and inconsis-
tent mandates that do not make theoretical sense and therefore
accord the trial judge almost unlimited discretion in these areas. He
or she may arbitrarily make a ruling based on either side of the con-
tradiction. Rulings are thus unlikely to be uniform or predictable on
these matters.'
Although the Federal Rules lack intellectual coherence in a
number of respects, this Essay focuses on only two examples:2 (1)
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which governs the admissibility of
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University. Former chair, American Bar Associa-
tion, Criminal Justice Section Committee on Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure;
former chair, Association of American Law Schools, Evidence Section; advisor on scien-
tific evidence, National Academy of Sciences, and Federal Judicial Center; consultant on
the drafting of the Federal Rules of Evidence, United States House and Senate Judiciary
Committees; and author of several books and approximately 100 articles. An earlier ver-
sion of this Essay was presented at the Evidence Section Program, Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools Annual Meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 7, 1995.
1. This is not to say that the Federal Rules did not make great strides forward in many
areas, and are not on the whole quite successful and a considerable advance over the previ-
ous system. But other improvements are possible.
2. I have commented on certain "intellectual incoherencies" in both Rule 404(b) and
Rule 901 on earlier occasions.
During my tenure as chairperson of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Committee
of the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section, the committee examined Rule
404(b) and made some excellent suggestions in connection with that rule that would have
helped with the problem noted here. Professor David Leonard chaired the working group
that produced these suggestions. See ABA Comm. on Rules of Criminal Procedure and
Evidence, Federal Rules of Evidence: A Fresh Review and Evaluation, 120 F.R.D. 299, 322-
35 (1987).
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prior crimes, wrongs, and acts to help establish a current alleged one;3
and (2) Federal Rule of Evidence 901, which involves authentication
and identification of documents and other items in order to establish
the genuineness of their connection to the litigated matter.4
II. RULE 404(b): OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, AND AcS
It is inescapable that the first sentence of Rule 404(b) 5 the pro-
hibitory sentence, is inconsistent with the second sentence, the permis-
sive sentence,6 at least as those sentences are currently interpreted.
The first sentence commands, in effect, "Thou shalt not use other
crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove character in order to prove an act in
conformity with that character." The second sentence, however, says,
in effect, "Yes, but you may use those other crimes, wrongs, or acts in
order to prove such facts as knowledge, intent, motive, identity, plan,
or absence of mistake or accident." The standard interpretation of
these two sentences is that evidence is excluded by the first sentence if
it is offered on a "propensity" theory-that is, that the defendant's
prior acts demonstrate a tendency to behave the same way in the fu-
ture. But, under the second sentence, the evidence may be admissible
if the relevance of the evidence does not depend on a propensity in-
ference. This dichotomy does not hold up under closer examination.
The first and second sentences cannot be construed consistently in
light of their interpretation in case law. Both describe evidence of-
fered on a propensity theory.
Two cases epitomize how the second, permissive sentence is ap-
plied. The old English "Brides of the Bath"'7 case is certainly one of
the primordial cases defining this category. In this case, the defendant
was accused of drowning several of his wives in the bathtub,8 a
number of whom were wealthy and left the defendant their money.
3. FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
4. FED. R. EvrD. 901.
5. The first sentence of Rule 404(b) reads as follows: "Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith." FED. R. Evm. 404(b).
6. The second sentence of Rule 404(b) reads as follows:
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, op-
portunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal
case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court
excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such
evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Id.
7. Rex v. Smith, 114 L.T.R. 239 (Crim. App. 1915).
8. I1& at 262.
[V/ol. 28:1259
INTELLECTUAL COHERENCE
"Oh, what a terrible accident" the defendant probably said when the
authorities were investigating the latest drowning. The authorities
were prepared to believe the man's lamentations until they learned
about the other dead wives. At trial the judge allowed evidence of the
other deaths to help prove the current charges. 9 The court admitted
the evidence pursuant to something akin to what is now the second
sentence of Rule 404(b), using catch words like plan, intent, knowl-
edge, and absence of mistake or accident.1"
The second case is Jones v. State," also known as the "Body Rub"
case. In that case a woman was charged with theft after she made
sexual advances to a man by rubbing her body against his in order to
distract him while she stole his wallet.'2 At trial the prosecution called
several witnesses who testified that the defendant had previously done
the same thing to them in the same manner.13 The evidence was ad-
mitted to help prove the charge stemming from the latest incident.' 4
As in Brides of the Bath, the court admitted the evidence pursuant to
many of the same catch words that are now incorporated into the sec-
ond sentence of Rule 404(b).' 5
Plainly, the evidence in both cases was admitted on a propensity
theory. In the first case the defendant had a propensity to drown his
wealthy wives in the bathtub, perhaps in order to inherit their for-
tunes. In the second case the defendant had a propensity to rub bod-
ies and make sexual overtures in order to steal the wallets of her
victims. Each defendant, therefore, was more likely to be guilty on
the present occasion. It is inescapable that a propensity theory was
used in the Brides of the Bath and Body Rub cases, but this is incon-
sistent with the first sentence of Rule 404(b) which appears to prohibit
such a theory.'
6
9. Id at 264.
10. Id (holding evidence was admissible to prove "design").
11. 376 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
12. Id at 842-43.
13. Id at 843.
14. Id.
15. Id (including "identity, intent, motive, malice or common plan or scheme").
16. This confusion, I believe, is responsible for the huge amount of litigation in the area
of Rule 404(b). Many of the conflicting decisions are detailed in PAUL F. RoTHSTEIN,
FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE: RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS
AND MAGISTRATES, Rule 404(b) (2d ed. 1994) and PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, EVIDENCE:
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS § 4.02 (1986). The situation is summarized in PAUL F.
ROTHSTEIN, EVIDENCE IN A NUTrsHELL: STATE AND FEDERAL RULES, ch. 8 (2d ed. 1981).
See also United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777,781-87 (3d Cir. 1994) (implicitly recog-
nizing problem); United States v. Sampson, 980 F2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing
that character evidence is often offered for improper purposes under guise of Rule 404(b));
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Several notions have been advanced to reconcile the apparent in-
consistency between these two sentences. A number of writers,17 fol-
lowing in the footsteps of recent English casesI 8 and Wigmore,' 9
suggest that the doctrine of chances affords a solution. They believe
the doctrine provides a way to infer guilt from the multiplicity of of-
fenses in cases like Brides of the Bath and Body Rub without relying
on the propensity reasoning that the first sentence prohibits. In other
words the doctrine provides a function for the second sentence that is
truly different from that of the first.
The doctrine of chances asks a question that supposedly recon-
ciles the dilemma. It asks, "What are the chances that an innocent
person would be charged falsely so many times?" If the answer is
"rarely," as it would be in Brides of the Bath and Body Rub,2 0 it is
safe to infer that the person is not innocent. It would be too coinci-
dental that an innocent defendant would be charged falsely so many
times. It is, therefore, possible to arrive at the inference of probable
guilt without using the prohibited propensity chain of reasoning-or
so it is argued.
The essence of this probable guilt argument is that there is a dis-
parity between the chances, or probability, that an innocent person
would be charged so many times and the chances, or probability, that
a guilty person would be charged so many times. If there is such a
United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 1987) (allowing judge to admit all
evidence of prior similar crimes produces "gravest risk of offending the central prohibition
of Rule 404(b)"). For recent cases searching for a rationale to admit evidence under Rule
404(b), see United States v. Sutton, 41 F.3d 1257, 1259 (8th Cir. 1994), petition for cert.
filed, (Mar. 6, 1995) (No. 94-8309); United States v. Bastanipour, 41 F.3d 1178, 1183 (7th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Ilutiven, 40 F.3d 1, 4-6 (1st Cir. 1994), cert denied, 131 L. Ed.
2d 243 (1995); United States v. Birch, 39 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (10th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Madden, 38 F.3d 747, 751-53 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 1269
(3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Jenkins, 7 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Miranda, 986 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2393 (1993); United States
v. Templeman, 965 F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992). I wish to
thank student Julie Brusslan for helping me wade through the mass of Rule 404(b) cases.
A number of these cases seem to produce results or make statements that are exactly the
opposite of others.
17. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Evolution of the Use of the Doctrine of
Chances as Theory of Admissibility for Similar Fact Evidence, 22 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 73
(1993).
18. See, e.g., R. v. P., 3 All E.R. 337 (H.L. 1991).
19. See 2 JoaN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAW § 302 (James H.
Chadbourn revisor, 1979); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Dispute over the Doctrine of
Chances, CRIM. JusT., Fall 1992, at 16, 19.
20. The question posed by the doctrine implies that the answer would almost always be
"rarely."
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disparity, however, it is only because a guilty person would have the
propensity to repeat the crime. If it were not for the propensity to
repeat, the chances, or the probability, that an innocent person and a
guilty person would be charged repeatedly would be identical. Hence,
the argument hinges on propensity and runs afoul of the first sentence
-of Rule 404(b). The effort to reconcile the permission in the Rule
with the prohibition in the Rule has failed.
Furthermore, the doctrine of chances does not answer any of the
hard questions raised by Rule 404(b). For example, how many other
crimes are needed and how similar must they be, including their mo-
dus operandi, to the present crime? The number and similarity of the
crimes greatly affect the degree of the disparity between the
probability that an innocent person, in comparison to a guilty one,
would be charged repeatedly. If the previous act is very different
from the present act, it is quite possible that an innocent person, as
well as a guilty person, might have been charged with both.
The doctrine of chances leaves open the question of how unlikely
it has to be that an innocent person would have been charged. Where
do we draw the line? When do crimes become numerous and similar
enough to the present crime that they cross over from inadmissibility
to admissibility? This is the central problem in the "other crimes,
wrongs, and acts" area that the doctrine of chances does not address.
The doctrine says that the evidence is admissible if it is unlikely that
an innocent person would be falsely charged so many times, but how
unlikely does it have to be?
In the movie Casablanca,21 the police, having heard a crime had
been committed, respond with the classic expression, "Round up the
usual suspects." As in real life, a person who has been charged before
commonly is charged again any time a vaguely similar crime is re-
ported. Thus, contrary to the doctrine of chances, it is not so unlikely
that an innocent person would be repeatedly charged falsely.
Furthermore, by admitting evidence on the theory that it is un-
likely that an innocent person would have been charged before, the
doctrine of chances encourages the police, judges, and juries to make
the assumption that the person must be guilty if he or she has been
charged previously. By asking the question, "How likely is it that an
innocent person would be charged so many times," the doctrine sug-
gests that if the police charged someone, he or she is probably guilty.
The doctrine sends a harmful message to the police, judges, and juries.
21. CASABLANCA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1942).
June 1995] 1263
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Contrary to the constitutional presumption of innocence, it invites
judge and jury to conclude that if a person has been charged, that
person is most probably guilty. In other words, police, judges, and
juries are licensed to do exactly what Rule 404(b) was designed to
prevent-assume guilt from previous charges. This is the foundation
of the doctrine. For these reasons, the doctrine of chances does not
provide a satisfactory way to reconcile the apparent internal inconsis-
tency in Rule 404(b).
This Essay proposes a more promising way to produce intellec-
tual coherence between the two sentences of Rule 404(b). My tenta-
tive suggestion, admittedly somewhat incomplete, is the following.
There are many different kinds of propensity. There are propen-
sities that are amorphous, diffuse, and tinged with moral approbation
or disapprobation, which we call character. For example, a person
who has cheated on an income tax return might have a non-law-abid-
ing character. However, this has only the weakest tendency to suggest
that that person, as compared with a totally law-abiding person, might
assault someone. Yet, it carries the burden of possible moral preju-
dice against the non-law-abiding person. The propensity is general
and laden with moral value-exactly what a lay person means by
"character." A lawless person, a violent person, a dishonest person,
and a thieving person are all descriptions of the propensity we call
character.
Another type of propensity is specific propensity. This is the pro-
pensity to do a certain thing in a certain way repeatedly. It may even
be called a plan, pattern, or scheme. The word "plan" here would be
used in the sense that these acts all proceed according to the same
blueprint, not necessarily that they have been planned together at the
same time.
Examples of specific propensities would be the propensity to rub
bodies to steal wallets or the propensity to drown wealthy spouses in
the bathtub in order to inherit. This is not the propensity we would
call character. No one would say that a person has the character to
drown wealthy spouses in the bathtub in order to inherit or that a
person has the character to rub bodies and make sexual overtures in
order to steal wallets. These propensities are too specific in that they
are addressed to the manner or means of carrying out the offense.
One would likely feel comfortable, however, saying that a person has
the "specific propensity" to do these things. While the general pro-
pensity called character has a moral tinge to it, other general propen-
sities do not, and the more specific propensity may or may not. In the
[Vol. 28:1259
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examples mentioned above, the specific propensity does have a moral
tinge.22
On the even more specific end of the propensity spectrum lies
"habit." Habit is earmarked by relative-not necessarily complete-
invariability and involuntariness. It is not necessarily morally tinged,
as is character. Habit is comprised of conduct very specifically like the
conduct in issue, and is marked by numerous instances of the conduct
that occur virtually whenever the same stimuli are presented.
Viewed in this way, the first sentence of 404(b) bans propensity,
but only when it is the general and morally tinged propensity known
as character. In other words, character, the word used and banned'in
the first sentence of the Rule, is not synonymous with "propensity."
Instead, character is just one type of propensity-the amorphous, gen-
eral, morally-tinged kind-that presents the specter of the several
dangers the character rule worries about: that the propensity is too
amorphous and general to lead to a solid inference of specific behav-
ior; that the jury may not realize this; and that they might be induced
to make prejudicial moral judgments of the person or relax the rigor
of their scrutiny of the facts based on their willingness to punish for
general or past "badness."
The second sentence, the permissive sentence of Rule 404(b),
licenses another kind of propensity. This is not character, which is
excluded, but the more specific kind of propensity that may not be
attended by the same dangers in the same degree. Finally, there is
habit, governed by Rule 406, which licenses an even more specific and
compelling kind of propensity-one that rises to such a level that we
can call it habit'z
III. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
The second intellectual incoherence in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence involves authentication and identification under Rule 901. The
22. Thus, the specific propensity evidence mentioned in the examples lacks one of the
negative aspects of character evidence, namely, the-perhaps disguised-probative weak-
ness of character evidence due to its generality. Yet the specific propensity has the other
negative aspect of character evidence-the moral tinge. But it is not character evidence,
subject to Rule 404(b); it is only subject to Rule 403, under which its prejudicial nature can
be individually appraised in comparison to its probative value.
23. Yet another type of propensity might be a documented clinical psychological ill-
ness, predilection, or personality trait as testified to by a properly qualified expert. The law
is unclear regarding this point.
June 1995] 1265
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Rules perpetuate an error fostered by Wigmore,2 4 an error that ap-
pears in the structure of the Rules, in the advisory committee notes to
Rule 90125 and Rule 104,26 and in the cases.27 The error is the
dogma-accepted now as "the law"-that the authentication and
identification requirement is just an aspect of relevancy. In other
words certain tangible evidence, such as a knife or document, is not
relevant unless a special quantum of evidence-known as "authenti-
cation" or "identification"-connecting the items with the litigated
matter is introduced as a foundational matter.
Under the traditional Wigmore doctrine, a knife, for example,
would have to be shown to be the knife used in the crime that is the
subject of the trial.2" Similarly, the signature "Paul Rothstein" on a
document would have to be shown to be genuine, if who signed the
document was important to the case. It is not enough, under the Wig-
more doctrine of authentication, that the signature purports to be my
signature. There needs to be an additional quantum of evidence that
the signature is genuine before the document is admissible, and this
additional quantum requirement is said to be a requirement of rele-
vancy. The additional quantum would be, for example, testimony that
someone recognizes the handwriting, that someone witnessed the
signing, or that the signature has distinctive characteristics such as the
little smiley faces that I may customarily put in the dots over the i.
The accepted belief, thanks to Wigmore and others, is that this kind of
authentication or identification is a necessity inherent in the notion of
relevance. It is this belief that is fundamentally wrong and causes seri-
ous problems.
Take the signature, for example. Certainly, it is slightly more
probable that it is Paul Rothstein's signature if it says "Paul Roth-
stein" than if it says "John Jones." Relevance, defined in Rule 401,
only requires the slightest increase in probability for evidence to be
relevant.29
24. 7 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2129 (James H.
Chadboum revisor, 1978).
25. FED. R. EvID. 901 advisory committee's note.
26. FED. R. EvrD. 104 advisory committee's note.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153,169-70 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 841 (1981).
28. All references to the knife case herein assume a prosecution for stabbing with a
knife.
29. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
[Vol. 28:1259
INTELLECTUAL COHERENCE
Whether or not the knife found in the defendant's possession and
offered into evidence was the same one used in the crime, the offered
knife is still relevant under Rule 401 as long as there is any possibility
that it was the knife used in the crime. Any such possibility produces
at least a tiny advance in proving guilt. Consequently, the knife is
relevant under Rule 401. In fact, even if there is no possibility the
knife was the same knife used in the crime, the offered knife is still
relevant in that it shows some degree of interest in knives or some
knowledge of knives on the part of the defendant. This in turn ad-
vances the possibility of guilt in some slight degree, as compared with
a situation where this evidence of interest or knowledge is absent.
The system may want to exclude the document signed by Paul
Rothstein or the knife found in the defendant's possession on a
ground other than relevance if the document or knife is not more con-
nected to the litigated event than the minimal connection posited
here. The system might want to keep these items out, not on the
grounds of relevancy, but because of considerations like those codified
in Federal Rule 403:30 The jury may exaggerate the probative force of
a document or knife that is so minimally connected to the case. The
possibility of prejudicing the defendant or misleading the jury may
outweigh the item's slim degree of relevancy.3 But it is important to
realize on what basis the computation must be made and what the
judge is supposed to consider. It is a Rule 403 computation.32
Although it is difficult to document the causes of the confusion in
the cases, decisions in this area are largely devoid of a consistent and
coherent rationale.33 This deficiency seems, at least in part, attributa-
ble to the error in thinking that I have outlined.
30. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumu-
lative evidence." FED. R. EviD. 403.
31. There may be other ways to get in the legitimate force of the evidence without this
undesirable baggage. For example, telling the jury that a knife was found in the defend-
ant's possession. Rule 403, however, might exclude the knife itself on a number of bases.
32. See supra note 30.
33. For examples of cases illustrating this inconsistency, see United States v. Neal, 36
F.3d 1190, 1210 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1498 (8th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 768 (1995); MDU Resources Group v. W.R. Grace & Co., 14 F.3d
1274, 1281-82 & n.12 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 89 (1994); United States v. Espi-
noza, 641 F.2d 153, 170-71 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 841 (1981); United States v.
Brown, 603 F.2d 1022, 1027-29 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Wilson, 532 F.2d 641, 644-
45 (8th Cir.), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976).
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Perhaps Wigmore can be forgiven for indulging in this error be-
cause his definition of relevancy required more than the slight in-
crease in probability required by the Federal Rules. Wigmore's
definition of "legal relevance" included consideration of factors like
those in Rule 403.34 Under the Federal Rule of Evidence, however,
there is little excuse for this error.
This error in thinking has led to an incongruence between Rule
901(a) and 901(b), both of which govern the quantum of proof needed
as a foundation for the authentication and identification of evidence.
Rule 901(a) states a general principle that there is sufficient authenti-
cation or identification of an item if there is enough evidence to sup-
port the conclusion of some reasonable person that the item was
authentic or identified.35 Rule 901(b) supposedly illustrates applica-
tions of the general rule of 901(a). However, subsection (b) actually
incorporates previous case law articulating more rigid requirements,36
and seems to require more than subsection (a). In its many examples
of how to authenticate or identify various items, and in its advisory
committee notes and the cases cited therein, Rule 901(b) plainly sug-
gests that more is required than the minimum that might satisfy a rea-
sonable person.37
Surely, in the signature example, even without any proof that the
signature is Paul Rothstein's, some reasonable person might feel there
is enough to form a conclusion that this is Paul Rothstein's signature
under Rule 901(a). The quantum of proof in 901(b), however, is
something more than merely ,the signature. For example, someone
34. 1A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVEDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 28, at 969 (Peter
Tillers revisor, 1983). Wigmore writes:
The judge, in his efforts to prevent the jury from being satisfied by matters of
slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty reasoning, has
constantly seen fit to exclude matter that does not rise to a clearly sufficient de-
gree of value. In other words, legal relevancy denotes, first of all, something
more than a minimum of -probative value. Each single piece of evidence must
have a plus value.
Id.
35. Rule 901(a) states: "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condi-
tion precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what its proponent claims." FED. R. EvD. 901(a); see also Neal,
36 F.3d at 1210 (finding that there was reasonable probability that evidence was what it
was purported to be); MDU Resources Group, 14 F.3d at 1281-82 (recognizing principle
via Rule 104 without mentioning Rule 901); cf Johnson, 28 F.3d at 1498 (finding that ade-
quate foundation was established).
36. See FED. R. EvID. 901(b) advisory committee's note.
37. Rule 901(b) states:
[Vol. 28:1259
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who knows Paul Rothstein's signature has to be able to identify it,3 8
the jury must compare an authenticated sample,39 there must be dis-
tinctive characteristics to the signature40 or distinctive characteristics
reflected in the document,4 ' or it must be validated by a handwriting
expert.4' A similar situation exists with the knife example.43
Thus, subsection (a) and subsection (b) send contradictory
messages. Subsection (a) requires a low quantum of proof such as
would satisfy a reasonable person in the conduct of normal affairs. In
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the
requirements of this rule:
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter is what it
is claimed to be.
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the genu-
ineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the
litigation.
(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness. Comparison by the trier of fact
or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated.
(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance,
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with
circumstances.
(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or
through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based
upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the
alleged speaker.
(6) Telephone conversations. Telephone conversations, by evidence that a
call was made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone company to a
particular person or business, if (A) in the case of a person, circumstances, includ-
ing self-identification, show the person answering to be the one called, or (B) in
the case of a business, the call was made to a place of business and the conversa-
tion related to business reasonably transacted over the telephone.
(7) Public records or reports. Evidence that a writing authorized by law to
be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported
public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is from the
public office where items of this nature are kept.
(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a document or
data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as to create no suspicion
concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where it, if authentic, would likely
be, and (C) has been in existence 20 years or more at the time it is offered.
(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system used to pro-
duce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authentication or
identification provided by Act of Congress or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
FED. R. EvD. 901(b).
38. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1), (2).
39. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3).
40. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
41. Id.
42. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3).
43. Rules 901(a) and (b) refer to "identification," which is generally taken to refer to
the foundation needed for tangible items other than writings. "Authentication" is the term
used in the case of writings.
June 1995] 1269
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contrast, subsection (b) requires a higher quantum of proof than that
of a reasonable person. Judges subject to these two contradictory
mandates may do anything that they want. And they do.44
These contradicting mandates can make a difference. Consider,
for example, a case in which an item or an unsigned document is
found in a dresser drawer of a party's bedroom. Seemingly, under the
standard of subsection (a)-the reasonable person standard-one
might be justified in concluding that this item or document belonged
to or was written by the party. The inference is not airtight but should
be enough to admit the evidence and allow it to be debated before the
jury. Some reasonable person could conclude that the item or docu-
ment probably belongs to or was written by the party. Subsection (b),
however, suggests that something more is required for admissibility
than what an ordinary reasonable person would require. The mere
fact that an item was in the party's dresser drawer might not be
enough to authenticate or identify it45 under the implication of subsec-
tion (b). Thus, a judge may decide either way. The conflict that exists
in the authentication cases reflects judges' confusion about exactly
what standard they are supposed to apply, and the confusion is not
entirely their fault. 6
IV. CONCLUSION
Incoherence concerning the admissibility of prior conduct and in-
coherence surrounding authentication and identification represent
only two of a number of similar problems in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, a generally admirable but far from perfect evidence code.
Rather than being worked out by the courts, these incoherencies,
which largely go unrecognized, have produced some pernicious results
in the cases and have magnified the amount of litigation in several
areas.
44. See supra note 33.
45. Remember, by "authenticate" or "identify," the law means only that the evidence
must meet a threshold that makes it admissible before the jurors, who then may or may not
find the item to be authentic or identified with the matter in controversy in accord with
their function as weighers of evidence:
46. See supra note 33. One solution to the dilemma would be to consider subsection
(a) as applying only to unanticipated cases not specifically envisioned by subsection (b).
The dresser drawer example might then be within (a) and not (b). But then there is a real
theoretical problem of another kind: Why should some cases be governed by a higher
standard than others just because they have been foreseen?
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